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The epidemic ofpellagra in the first halfofthis century at its peak produced at least 250,000
cases and caused 7,000 deaths a year for several decades in 15 southern states. It also filled
hospital wards in other states, which had a similar incidence but refused to report their cases.
Political influences interfered, not only with surveillance of the disease, but also in its study,
recognition of its cause, and the institution of preventive measures when they became known.
Politicians and the general public felt that it was more acceptable for pellagra to be infectious
than for it to be a form of malnutrition, a result of poverty and thus an embarrassing social
problem. Retrospectively, a change in the method of milling cornmeal, degermination, which
began shortly after 1900, probably accounted for the appearance of the epidemic; such a
process was suggested at the time, but the suggestion was ignored.
The story of the epidemic of pellagra in the United States, which occurred in the
first half of the twentieth century, may remind people of contemporary events
surrounding the AIDS epidemic, when social and political forces have affected
medical research. To a very real extent, history has been repeating itself. The
epidemic of pellagra, which caused over 3 million cases and 100,000 deaths in the
U.S., hasbeenlargelyforgotten, and the reasonforthe outbreakis notwidelyknown,
even though it is a phenomenon which caused a similar disease outbreak in the Far
East (beriberi) beginning a fewyears earlier, and it could happen again.
THE HISTORY OF PELLAGRA
Abriefbiography ofpellagra mayhelp to put the events in the U.S. in the first half
ofthis century into perspective. Pellagra waswell known in Spain and northern Italy,
beginning in 1735, with the first description of the disease by Don Pedro Casal,
physician to King Philip V of Spain. Casal first observed the disease in the town of
Oviedo, in the Asturias region, where it was known as "malde la rosa" because ofits
characteristic red rash. Although Casal thought it was a peculiar form ofleprosy, his
descriptions were extremely accurate, and the rash in the exposed areas around the
neck is still known as "Casal's necklace" [1].
Casal associated the disease with poverty and noted that the diet of pellagrins
consisted largely ofcornmeal and little meat. He suggested that the disease was due
to spoilage ofthe corn, and the association ofpellagra with corn remained the focus
ofetiologic speculation well into the twentieth century.
American Indian corn, or maize, when introduced into the Old World, increased
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the yield of food calories per acre well beyond that previously provided by rye and
wheat. An increase in population per cultivated acre followed, beginning during the
second halfofthe seventeenth century. The use ofcorn as a staple food crop spread
from Spain to southern France, Italy, Romania, Russia, and Egypt; pellagra followed
[2]. Cornmeal was the main source of calories for poor people, especially in the
springbefore new cropswere ready; the resulting seasonal occurrence ofpellagra led
to the name "the springtime disease."
The association of pellagra with corn resulted in many theories to explain the
origin of the new disease, often called "Zeism," based on the Latin name for maize,
Zea mays. The "spoiled corn" theory was analogous to the cause of ergotism, which
results from a toxin produced by a mold that contaminates rye. Repeated attempts
were made to demonstrate an organism growing in moldy corn which could produce
the symptoms of pellagra in men or animals. Despite lack of success, the theory
remained popular, and laws were passed prohibiting the sale of spoiled or moldy
corn. Thus the association of pellagra with poverty and corn was well established
before the disease became common in the United States [2].
AN EPIDEMIC OF PELLAGRA IN THE UNITED STATES
Pellagrawas a new disease toAmericanphysicianswhenthe first casesbegan tobe
reported. Asingle case in a Georgia farmerin 1902was reported to the state Medical
Association [3] and attributed to spoiled corn, but it attracted little interest. In 1906,
Dr. George H. Searcy recognized pellagra at the Mount Vernon annex to the Bryce
Hospital for Alabama Insane in Tuscaloosa. He described 88 cases, with a mortality
rate of64 percent, in the Alabama state medicaljournal in 1907 [4], and inJAA4 in
1907 [5]. Searcyreviewed hospital records andthought he had found afewcases each
year since 1901.
The disease then began to be diagnosed in other mental hospitals. In 1908, Dr.
JamesBabcock, the superintendentofthe State Hospital forthe Insane in Columbia,
South Carolina, realized that patients in that hospital were dying of a new disease,
which he had not seen before. Because of the earlier reports of the outbreak of
pellagra in mental hospitals, hediagnosed the newdisease aspellagra and reported it
in the American Joumal of Insanity [6]. The new disease rapidly increased in
frequency, and it began to be recognized in inmates of prisons, orphanages, and in
the general population. Records for 1907-11 for eight southern states reveal 15,870
cases, with a fatality rate of 39.1 percent [7]. Physicians aware of the mounting
epidemic became concerned.
During the summer of 1908, Babcock took avacation tour ofEurope with the U.S.
Senator from South Carolina, Benjamin R. Tillman. Troubled by the cases of
pellagra in Columbia, they visited several hospitals for pellagrins in Italy. Tillman
was horrified by what he saw and asked the U.S. Vice-Consul in Milan to prepare a
report about the disease and government attempts to control it [7].
Back in South Carolina, the State Board of Health became concerned about the
spread of the epidemic of pellagra. Influenced by Babcock and Senator Tillman,
Governor Martin Ansell called interested people together for a conference on
pellagra inColumbia, on December9, 1908. Seventy-twophysicians attended, mostly
fromwithin the state.
Both the Governor and Senator Tillman spoke at the meetings, lavishly praising
Babcock for identifying the disease and calling attention to the developing epidemic.
212POLITICS AND PELLAGRA
That meeting, later known as the first National Conference on Pellagra, led to press
reports of the spread ofthe disease, which aroused great alarm, the beginning ofthe
"pellagra scare."
When a second National Conference on Pellagra was held in Columbia on
November 3, 1909, 394 physicians attended, reporting outbreaks of the disease in
many parts of the country, especially in orphanages, mental hospitals, and prisons.
The National Association for the StudyofPellagrawasformed; Babcockwas elected
first president. The conference recognized Babcock as "the father of the movement
for the study and control of pellagra in America" [8]. The Association met again in
1912 and 1915.
WAS PELLAGRA A NEW DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES?
Pellagra was relatively easy to recognize, since it produced characteristic skin and
mucous membrane lesions, plus diarrhea and mental changes. The syndrome was
referred to as the "three D's": dermatitis, diarrhea, and dementia; the fourth "D"
was death. Nineteenth-century American physicians who had trained or traveled
abroad knew the disease, but only a few isolated cases had been diagnosed in this
country, and those primarily in mental hospitals. In Osler's first seven editions ofhis
classic text, publishedbetween 1892 and 1909, he gave an excellent description ofthe
clinical manifestations ofpellagra and described its associationwith corn, but stated:
"It has not been observed in this country."
New disease or not, the incidence of pellagra markedly increased during the first
few years after it was recognized and brought to medical and public attention. And
the epidemic continued to spread and increase in virulence for several decades.
During the first four years after recognizing the disease, Babcock found 435 cases in
his hospital. The Georgia State Asylum for the Insane in Milledgeville recorded 40
deaths from pellagra in 1908; by 1909, there were 73, and pellagra moved ahead of
tuberculosis as the most frequent cause of death in that and other mental hospitals.
In 1915, Milledgeville had 1,433 cases with 220 deaths-35 percent of all deaths in
the institution [7]. The epidemic was not limited to the South, however; Peoria State
Hospital in Illinois reported 135 cases in 1909, with 45 deaths [7]. Retrospectively, it
was estimated that there were 1,000 cases of pellagra in the entire country in 1909,
and, between 1907 and 1911, a total of 16,000 cases were reported in 18 states.
Reporting was never complete, however, each state deciding whether it would
recognize and publicly admit the existence ofthis embarrassingplague. The reported
cases never included pellagrins in mental hospitals and thus were always underesti-
mates ofthe incidence ofthe disease.
During 1915, estimates of the total number of cases reached 75,000, and, by the
1920s, there were about 100,000 cases peryear. Thus, a disease affectingpatients in a
few mental hospitals developed into a huge epidemic. In 1924, reports of pellagra
came from a total of36 states and the District ofColumbia; the nine southern states
included in the reporting area-Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North and South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia-accounting for 90 percent of
the cases. Populous southern states known to have a high incidence of pellagra,
including Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, and West Virginia, were not included in the
reporting area, and the true extent of the epidemic always was greatly underesti-
mated.
During the period from 1915 to 1925, the first decade of reporting, 27,648 deaths
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from pellagra were recorded. House-to-house surveys during that period, seeking
unhospitalized cases, suggested that there were at least 35 non-fatal cases for each
death. On the basis of that estimate, a total of 967,000 cases of pellagra occurred
during that decade alone. Another million cases are thought to have occurred
between 1925 and 1930, and, in the decade which followed before the disease was
virtually eliminated, it is likely that another million cases occurred. Overall, there-
fore, the epidemic of pellagra, which lasted from about 1906 to 1940, resulted in
roughly 3 million cases, with 100,000 deaths in the reporting states. That such a huge
epidemic has quietly disappeared, to the extent that most physicians today have
never seen a case and are not even aware of its frequency in the early part of this
century, is quite remarkable.
THE POLITICS OF THE STUDY OF THE ETIOLOGY OF PELLAGRA
Newspapers, headlining reports of the spreading epidemic, generated a public
reaction referred to as "pellagraphobia" [9]. Statewide conferences were held,
"Pellagra Commissions" formed, and the first hospital for the care of patients with
pellagra was opened in Atlanta in October 1911. The Surgeon General ofthe Public
Health Service, Walter Wyman, said in his annual report in 1911 that pellagra
threatened to become a "national calamity." In 1912, therewere urgent callsforhelp
to the federal government from Mississippi, Tennessee, and North Carolina; state
health officers, at their annual meeting that year, requested a federal commission to
study pellagra. Congressman John M. Faison of North Carolina introduced a
resolution in the House to appropriate $25,000 for that purpose [7].
Two philanthropists, Col. Robert M. Thompson ofNew York and J.H. McFadden
of Philadelphia, donated $15,000 for the study ofpellagra. Many physicians refused
to acknowledge the severity of the problem, but the Spartanburg (South Carolina)
County Medical Society voted to cooperate, and field studies were set up there. The
Thompson-McFadden Pellagra Commission studied cases in the cotton mill districts,
conducting a house-to-house survey. The commission concluded that there was no
relationship between the disease and diet, but that its spread seemed most rapid
when sanitary disposal of waste was poorest, and that the disease occurred almost
exclusively in people who lived in or next to the house of another person with
pellagra. The association of the disease with poverty, and thus its clustering in the
poorer areas of town where housing and sanitary facilities were worst, was not
mentioned. Proponents of the infection theory of the etiology of pellagra found
support in the reports ofthe commission and quoted them for decades [10-13].
The rapidity with which the incidence of pellagra reached epidemic proportions
prejudiced thinking about its etiology toward an infectious agent. It was self-evident,
at that time, that all epidemic disease would be found to have a microbial cause;
dramatic advances in medical science had just occurred-causative agents of the
major diseases ofthe timewerebeing discovered at the rate ofabout a disease ayear,
including typhoid fever, lobar pneumonia, tuberculosis, cerebrospinal meningitis,
syphilis, cholera, malaria, dysentery, scarlet fever, tetanus, and diphtheria; some had
clearly defined insect vectors.
Surgeon General Walter Wyman appointed a seven-man commission to study the
disease, and assigned Dr. Claude H. Lavinder, a highly regarded epidemiologist, to
find the etiologic agent and perhaps identify an insect vector. Lavinder toured
214POLITICS AND PELLAGRA
affected areas [14] and established a small laboratory at the South Carolina Hospital
for the Insane in May 1909. Followingthe procedure ofItalian investigators, who had
reported a "Streptobacillus pellagrae," he injected rabbits, chickens, and guinea pigs
with blood, spinal fluid, and spleen pulp from fatal cases ofpellagra, without results.
In 1911, he set up a larger laboratory at the Marine Hospital in Savannah and
attempted to transmit the causative agent to monkeys. In 1912, Lavinderwas elected
president ofthe National Association for the StudyofPellagra.
Publicity continued to influence developments. An association of pellagra with
poverty was clear, and emphasis on miserable economic conditions in much of the
South, where the disease was concentrated, was embarrassing, an affront to delicate
Southern pride, still sensitive from the "lost cause" ofa halfcenturybefore. As cases
multiplied, embarrassment increased, and attitudes toward former heroes changed.
Babcock was forced to resign in 1914, amid a blaze of publicity and a legislative
investigation of the State Hospital for the Insane. He was accused ofhaving brought
injury to the reputation and progress of South Carolina by calling attention to the
prevalence ofpellagra in the state [7].
When the epidemiologic studies of Dr. Joseph Goldberger, a physician who was
both a Northerner and an immigrant, pointed to social and economic factors asbeing
responsible for the occurrence ofpellagra, because ofthe effect they had on the diet
ofthe poor, southern sensitivitieswere furtherriled. Suchconclusionswere unaccept-
able, and a severe setback to the expectation that the "South would rise again," at
least economically. Editorial pages and speeches by congressmen criticized and
condemned such insulting inferences concerning the contentment of the people of
the South. Furthermore, the suggested remedyofimproving the diet ofimpoverished
citizens was clearly impractical.
At one point, a letter fromJoseph Goldberger to the Surgeon General reached the
press, describing the extent of pellagra and its relationship to poverty and poor diet;
it stimulated the newlyinaugurated president, Warren Harding, towrite the Surgeon
General asking for a complete report. Hardingsuggested that the Red Cross provide
aid, and offered to askfor acongressional appropriation. The attendant publicitywas
too much for southern pride. Congressman James F. Byrnes (later U.S. Senator,
Secretary of State, and Supreme Court Justice) called the news reports of "famine
and plague" in South Carolina an "utter absurdity," calling for rejection ofoffers of
aid from the Red Cross. A Georgia city wired one of their senators, Tom Watson,
"When this part ofGeorgia suffers from famine, the rest ofthe world will be dead!"
[7]. The United Daughters of the Confederacy at first voted to thank President
Harding for his concern, but a month later it sent him a letter of protest. "Famine
does not exist anywhere in the South," their letter stated, "and we fail to find a
general increase in pellagra"[7].
Pellagra was a "social stigma," but its existence was undeniable; thus it was more
acceptable for it to be considered infectious than a direct result of poverty. Since
pellagra was known to be common in Italy, an influx of Italian immigrants into the
South could be blamed for the outbreakofthe disease. No one seemed to notice that
the Italians living in the southeastern U.S. did not have pellagra, since they did not




When Lavinder asked to be reassigned in 1914, Surgeon General Rupert Blue
substituted another officer experienced in the study of epidemic infectious disease,
Dr. Joseph G. Goldberger, then aged 40. Goldberger's earlier epidemiological
studies had determined the nature of several disease outbreaks, and he had acquired
and survived many of them. His experience and acquired immunity made him the
ideal investigator of the cause of the latest epidemic of infectious disease, pellagra.
Goldberger had immigrated to the U.S. from Hungary at the age of six, and his
parents had managed to send him to Bellevue (New York University) School of
Medicine. He graduated before he was 21 and served an 18-month internship at that
hospital during 1896 and 1897. After unsuccessful attempts to earn a living in private
practice and to join the Navy during the Spanish-American War, he took a competi-
tive examination for the Public Health Service. He scored highest in the country and
spent the rest of his career in that service [15].
When Goldberger began his assignment, the epidemic was still growing, and
national concern was increasing. Starting with a three-week tour of southern
institutions, including a hospital for pellagrins in Spartanburg, South Carolina, the
Georgia State Asylum for the Insane in Milledgeville, and orphanages in Jackson,
Mississippi, Goldberger confirmed the earlier observations reported by Searcy [4,5]
that staffmembers who were in intimate contact with the inmates never got pellagra,
and he immediately dismissed the concept that pellagra was communicable. His
certainty that the disease was not infectious was reinforced by the studies of Dr.
Edward Francis, who, working with Lavinder in Savannah, had failed to transmit the
disease to monkeys [16], and Francis, who had caught every other disease he had
worked on, had not caught pellagra.
Struck by the limited, monotonous diet served at those institutions, Goldberger
immediately focused on it as a likely cause ofthe disease. He had difficulty explaining
the absence of the disease in staffmembers, since they usually ate the same meals in
the same dining rooms. He noticed, however, that the staffate first, taking the leanest
portions of the meat and whatever variety was available, and, of course, they could
also supplement their diet with food obtained outside the institution. At the Georgia
State Sanitarium, milkwas occasionally served to patients, but attendants, who never
got pellagra, drank it twice a day. Inmates were left with cornmeal mush, cane syrup
or molasses, gravy, and biscuits-the ubiquitous diet of the poor southerner. This
diet was called the "Three M's," meaning meat, meal, and molasses; the meat was
mostlyvery fatty pork, such as "fatback," and the meal was cornmeal.
At orphanages, the pellagra occurred among children who were between six and
12, but rarely affected infants or older children. Such gaps in the distribution of the
disease would not occur ifthe disease were infectious. Goldberger noted that infants
were given whatever milk was available, and older children were given work to do
and fed a little better. In Jackson, at the Methodist Orphanage, 68 of 211 children
(32 percent) had pellagra on July 1, 1914; at the Baptist Orphanage, he found 136
among 226 (60 percent), plus 24 suspected cases [17,18].
Goldberger estimated that it would cost $700 a month to provide adequate food to
each orphanage; beginning in September 1914, using federal funds to test his
hypothesis that dietary inadequacy was the cause of the disease, Goldberger pro-
vided the orphans at the two institutions in Jackson a more varied diet, including
fresh meat once a week and abundant milk. He also began a similar study among the
216POLITICS AND PELLAGRA
inmates in one building of the asylum at Milledgeville. Cases of pellagra in these
institutions cleared, and, in the spring of 1915, when new cases were expected, none
occurred, and no relapses were observed [19,20].
Goldberger's report to the Public Health Service revealed his elation with the
results and his optimism that the disease could be controlled. But, as soon as the
federal funds ran out, the old diet was resumed and pellagra returned; during the
spring of 1916, 40 percent ofthe children in the orphanages had the disease.
In the fall of 1914, still in the first year ofhis studies, Goldbergerwas asked togive
the Cutter lecture on preventive medicine at Harvard, where he was well received
and congratulated. Hewas also invited to speak at the Southern Medical Association
and the Association for the Study ofPellagra in 1915. Proponents ofthe theory of an
infectious etiology dominated those meetings, and Goldberger was attacked and
vilified. His conclusion that a morevaried dietwasneeded, one which included other
sources ofvegetable protein, especially beans, was considered absurd.
To convince the skeptics, Goldberger decided to try inducing pellagra with an
experimental diet. Earl Brewer, the Governor of Mississippi, cooperated by offering
pardons to inmates of the Rankin Prison Farm who participated in the experiment.
There had neverbeen a case at the 3,200-acre prison. Twelve membersofa "pellagra
squad" were housed separately in clean quarters, to isolate them from possible
spread of infectious material from other inmates; they were fed biscuits, gravy,
cornbread, grits, rice, syrup, collard greens, and yams, while the rest ofthe prisoners
were given a morevaried diet.
The experiment began on February 4, 1915, and was terminated on October 31,
when manifestations of pellagra were present in six of the 11 volunteers [21,22].
Several were so miserable that they tried to end the experiment prematurely, one
saying, "I have been through a thousand hells!" while others pleaded for a quick
death from a bullet. Goldberger was accused of torture, and Governor Brewer was
accused of having arranged the whole experiment in order to be able to pardon two
ofthe prisonerswhowere hisfriends, convicted ofembezzlement. Skeptics remained
unconvinced that pellagra was not infectious [7].
Goldberger had not mentioned the Rankin prison farm experiment during the
Columbia meeting in 1915, since itwasbeing conducted secretly, but twoweeks later
the information appeared in the newspapers. Physicians who had attended the
meeting and supported Goldberger were now loudly critical.
In a further attempt to demonstrate that the disease could not be transmitted in
the fashion of known infections, Goldberger set up "filth parties." He had himself,
his wife, and his associates injected with blood from pellagrins, and then he and his
male colleagues wrapped skin scales, feces, dried urine, and other dirt from pella-
grins in dough and swallowed repeated doses. None ofthem gotpellagra, oranything
else except nausea and mild diarrhea [23] (mirabiledictu), but these studies were also
dismissed, since pellagra was more common in women, and thus his staff must have
been "constitutionally resistant" to the disease.
Goldberger eventually stopped trying to convince the stubborn believers in an
infectious etiology forthe disease and devoted the remainder ofhis life to an attempt
to identify the factor which prevented or cured pellagra. Various names were
suggested for the factor, includingvitamin G for Goldberger, but he called it "PPF,"
pellagra preventive factor. His dietary approaches cured thousands of patients
before PPF was eventually identified as nicotinic acid.
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An animal model of pellagra was sought, since the human studies were laborious
and dangerous. A dog model came to Goldberger's attention almost accidentally. In
1916, Russell H. Chittenden and Frank P. Underhill, studying malnutrition at Yale,
feddogs boiled peas, cracker meal, and cottonseed oil [24]. The dogs developed sores
and hemorrhages in the mouth; the dried, crusted blood led to the name "black
tongue."
In the South, a disease in dogs, "canine plague," was thought to be related to
human pellagra, since they occurred in the same localities, reinforcing thinking that
pellagrawas infectious. Goldberger did not study the disease in dogs until he learned
that black tongue had developed in hunting dogs of an employee at the research
facility at the Georgia State Asylum in Milledgeville, when the dogs were fed half
their usual ration, supplemented with cornbread, supposedly to improve their
hunting avidity. Autopsy revealed black tongue [25]. The sore mouth made the dogs
unwilling to swallow (as occurred in human cases), and yeast was generally used to
stimulate appetites. The Public Health Service investigators soon realized that yeast
contained the "pellagra preventive factor" and then found it to be the most potent
source ofthis factor [26].
Yeast then began to be used in the treatment of human pellagra, where it was
particularly valuable for patients whose painful mouth lesions prevented them from
swallowing, and it saved many lives before parenteral treatment became available.
Yeast also saved many lives when Goldberger arranged to have the Red Cross ship
large quantities of it into flood-stricken areas along the Mississippi River in 1927
[27]. The expected outbreak ofpellagra did not occur; instead, the disease fell below
its usual seasonal incidence. After the emergency, yeast was no longer provided, and
the usual level ofpellagra returned to the area.
Liver was known to be a rich source of pellagra preventive factor and, later, when
George Minot's liver extract began to be used to treat pernicious anemia, Gold-
berger arranged through Minot to obtain some from the Eli Lilly Company, which
was beginning commercial production. The extract was effective in black tongue in
dogs [28] and was valuable in treating humans who could not swallow. (This study
was the last organized by Goldberger before his death from renal cancer on January
17, 1929.)
The final, virtually complete elimination of pellagra dates to the 1940s. Elvehjem
and Koehn showed that nicotinic acid was the specific micronutrient deficiency [29],
and Sydenstricker and others showed that most patients with pellagra actually had
deficiencies ofseveral vitamins, particularly ofthe B group, including riboflavin [30].
The availability ofcheap, synthetic forms ofthe various vitamins led to legislation in
manystates requiring their addition to commonly used foods [31]. Several nutritional
deficiency syndromes were virtually eliminated, almost simultaneously.
WHY DID THE EPIDEMIC OF PELLAGRA OCCUR?
The reason for the appearance, or at least the marked increase in frequency, of
pellagra in the U.S. in the early years of the twentieth century has not been
thoroughly studied. A phenomenon which caused epidemics of another nutritional
deficiency disease, the outbreak of beriberi in the Far East, which had appeared
about two decades earlier, seems to have been the cause.
The "Three M" diet of meat, meal, and molasses had long been a favorite,
especially among the poor, in the South. This diet led to pellagra, and it still does if
218POLITICS AND PELLAGRA
sufficient amounts of other foods are not combined with it. The long-standing
popularity of this ubiquitous diet was one of the reasons Goldberger had difficulty
convincing southerners that pellagra was due to diet and was not infectious. Maize
had been a dietary staple of the American Indians, and no change had occurred in
the genetics ofthe corn used, or in the method ofplanting and harvesting, to account
for the appearance of an epidemic of pellagra in the U.S. early in the twentieth
century. The Indians ground their corn into meal using lime water, and alkali has
been demonstrated to increase the extraction ofthe nicotinic acidwhich is present in
corn, increasing its nutritional value. This practice may account for the absence of
any known pellagra among the Indians, but it is more likely that avaried diet was the
most important factor.
Casimir Funk, who helped elucidate the role ofthiamin in the etiology ofberiberi,
was an early investigator ofthe problem ofpellagra. He thought that micronutrients
in addition to the "anti-neuritic factor" would be found to be necessary for life.
Beriberi had developed as an epidemic in the Far East in the 1880s after a change
occurred in the method ofmilling rice. Funksuggested that the same mechanismwas
responsible for the outbreak ofpellagra [321-but no attentionwaspaid to his article
on this subject.
Changes in the methods of milling corn might have resulted in the outbreak of
pellagra, since the germ or embryo in the corn kernel contains a high proportion of
the lipid, enzymes, and co-factors, including nicotinic acid. Degerminating corn
during milling removes the embryo with the lipid and enzymes, and the resulting
cornmeal is more stable and can be stored and shippedwithout enzymatic decay; this
type of change is exactly the same phenomenon which occurs when rice is finely
milled.
Aquestion relevant to the epidemic ofpellagra, therefore, is,when did degermina-
tion of corn begin? The epidemic began shortly after the turn of the century.
Degermination ofcorn began after the Beall degerminator waspatented in 1900 and
1901. That information provides an explanation ofsome puzzlingobservations ofthe
epidemiology of pellagra. The disease was most prevalent in institutions in which
people existed on a restricted, monotonous diet for long periods. In the South,
cornmeal was a main source of calories in these institutional diets, but, despite
cornmeal's restricted nutritional value, pellagra was rare or non-existent until after
1900. After degermination began, the food used for the same diet was less nutrition-
ally adequate [331.
Epidemiologic investigations, including those conducted by Goldberger, pointed
to anespecially high incidence ofpellagra in the cotton-growing areas near thetextile
mill towns, along the railroad lines in the rural South, and an inverse relation to
income in those areas [341. In retrospect, we can see that, in the textile mill towns,
surrounded by cotton fields, food was shipped in by railroad, and the cornmeal that
could be purchased in the company stores was processed in the Midwest, where it
had been degerminated. More rural areas had less pellagra; being away from the
railroads, they ground their own corn, mostly in old, water-driven stone mills. The
tradition still exists in the South that "stone-ground" corn is healthier. When the new
method ofdegerminating the corn was introduced, the precarious diet ofthe poor in
mill towns and institutions became even worse, and pellagra appeared.
If changes in food technology caused outbreaks of deficiency disease, could the
same process happen again? Beriberi and pellagra may not be the only possible
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examples of changes in food technology which might be introduced because of
commercial advantages, but which can result in outbreaks of disease not recognized
for long periods as nutritional in origin.
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